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PREFACE

About this book
There are few things more fascinating to study than the human mind. And few things that are more difficult to understand. Cognitive science is the enterprise of trying to make sense of this most complex and baffling natural phenomenon.
The very things that make cognitive science so fascinating make it very difficult to study and to teach. Many different disciplines study the mind. Neuroscientists study the mind's biological machinery. Psychologists directly study mental processes such as perception and decision-making. Computer scientists explore how those processes can be simulated and modeled in computers. Evolutionary biologists and anthropologists speculate about how the mind evolved. In fact, there are very few academic areas that are not relevant to the study of the mind in some way. The job of cognitive science is to provide a framework for bringing all these different perspectives together. This enormous range of information out there about the mind can be overwhelming, both for students and for instructors. I have had direct experience of how challenging this can be, as Director of the Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology program at Washington University in St. Louis. The challenge is to give students a broad enough base while at the same time bringing home that cognitive science is a field in its own right, separate and distinct from the disciplines on which it draws. I set out to write this book because my colleagues and I have not yet found a book that really succeeds in doing this.
Different textbooks have approached this challenge in different ways. Some have concentrated on being as comprehensive as possible, with a chapter covering key ideas in each of the relevant disciplines -a chapter on psychology, a chapter on neuroscience, and so on. These books are often written by committee -with each chapter written by an expert in the relevant field. These books can be very valuable, but they www.cambridge.org © in this web service Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-70837-1 -Cognitive Science: An Introduction to the Science of the Mind Jose Luis Bermudez Frontmatter More information xviii Preface really give an introduction to the cognitive sciences (in the plural), rather than to cognitive science as an interdisciplinary enterprise.
Other textbook writers take a much more selective approach, introducing cognitive science from the perspective of the disciplines that they know best -from the perspective of philosophy, for example, or of computer science. Again, I have learnt much from these books and they can be very helpful. But I often have the feeling that students need something more general.
This book aims for a balance between these two extremes. Cognitive science has its own problems and its own theories. The book is organized around these. They are all ways of working out the fundamental idea at the heart of cognitive science -which is that the mind is an information processor. What makes cognitive science so rich is that this single basic idea can be (and has been) worked out in many different ways.
In presenting these different models of the mind as an information processor I have tried to select as wide a range of examples as possible, in order to give students a sense of cognitive science's breadth and range.
Cognitive science has only been with us for forty or so years. But in that time it has changed a lot. At one time cognitive science was associated with the idea that we can understand the mind without worrying about its biological machinery -we can understand the software without understanding the hardware, to use a popular image.
But this is now really a minority view. Neuroscience is now an absolutely fundamental part of cognitive science. Unfortunately this has not really been reflected in textbooks on cognitive science. This book presents a more accurate picture of how central neuroscience is to cognitive science.
How the book is organized
This book is organized into five parts. This approach to mental architecture sets the agenda for the rest of the book.
Part I: Historical overview
Part III: Information-processing models of the mind
The four chapters in Part III explore the two dominant models of information processing in contemporary cognitive science. The first model is associated with the physical symbol system hypothesis originally developed by the computer scientists Allen Newell and Herbert Simon. According to the physical symbol system hypothesis, all information processing involves the manipulation of physical structures that function as symbols. The theoretical case for the physical symbol system hypothesis is discussed in Chapter 6, while Chapter 7 gives three very different examples of research within that paradigm -from data mining, artificial vision, and robotics.
The second model of information processing derives from models of artificial neurons in computational neuroscience and connectionist artificial intelligence. Chapter 8 explores the motivation for this approach and introduces some of the key concepts, while Chapter 9 shows how it can be used to model aspects of language learning and object perception.
Part IV: How is the mind organized?
A mental architecture includes a model both of information processing and of how the mind is organized. The three chapters in Part IV look at different ways of tackling this second problem. Chapter 10 examines the idea that some forms of information processing are carried out by dedicated cognitive modules. It looks also at the radical claim, proposed by evolutionary psychologists, that the mind is simply a collection of specialized modules. In Chapter 11 we look at how some recently developed techniques such as functional neuroimaging can be used to study the organization of the mind. Chapter 12 shows how the theoretical and methodological issues come together by working through an issue that has received much attention in contemporary www.cambridge.org © in this web service Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-70837-1 -Cognitive Science: An Introduction to the Science of the Mind Jose Luis Bermudez Frontmatter More information xx Preface cognitive science -the issue of whether there is a dedicated cognitive system response for our understanding of other people (the so-called mindreading system).
Part V: New horizons
As emerges very clearly in the first four parts of the book, cognitive science is built around some very basic theoretical assumptions -and in particular around the assumption that the mind is an information-processing system. In Chapter 13 we look at two ways in which cognitive scientists have proposed extending and moving beyond this basic assumption. One of these research programs is associated with the dynamical systems hypothesis in cognitive science. The second is opened up by the situated/embodied cognition movement.
Using this book in courses
This book has been designed to serve as a self-contained text for a single semester (12-15 weeks) introductory course on cognitive science. Students taking this course may have taken introductory courses in psychology and/or philosophy, but no particular prerequisites are assumed. All the necessary background is provided for a course at the freshman or sophomore level (first or second year). The book could also be used for a more advanced introductory course at the junior or senior level (third or fourth year). In this case the instructor would most likely want to supplement the book with additional readings. There are suggestions on the instructor website (see below).
Text features
I have tried to make this book as user-friendly as possible. Key text features include:
INTRODUCTION
Here is a short, but accurate, definition of cognitive science: Cognitive science is the science of the mind. Much of this book is devoted to explaining what this means. As with any area of science, cognitive scientists have a set of problems that they are trying to solve and a set of phenomena that they are trying to model and explain. These problems and phenomena are part of what makes cognitive science a distinctive discipline. Equally important, cognitive scientists share a number of basic assumptions about how to go about tackling those problems. They share a very general conception of what the mind is and how it works. The most fundamental driving assumption of cognitive science is that minds are information processors. As we will see, this basic idea can be developed in many different ways, since there are many different ways of thinking about what information is and how it might be processed by the mind.
The chapters in this first section of the book introduce the picture of the mind as an information processor by sketching out some of the key moments in the history of cognitive science. Each chapter is organized around a selection of infl uential books and articles that illustrate some of the important concepts, tools, and models that we will be looking at in more detail later on in the book. We will see how the basic idea that the mind is an information processor emerged and look at some of the very different ways in which it has been developed.
We begin in Chapter 1 by surveying some of the basic ideas and currents of thought that we can, in retrospect, see as feeding into what subsequently emerged as cognitive science. These ideas and currents of thought emerged during the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s in very different and seemingly unrelated areas. The examples we will look at range from experiments on problem-solving in rats to fundamental breakthroughs in mathematical logic, and from studies of the grammatical structure of language to information-processing models of how input from the senses is processed by the mind.
The early flourishing of cognitive science in the 1960s and 1970s was marked by a series of powerful and influential studies of particular aspects of mental functioning. In Chapter 2 we survey three examples, each of which has been taken by many to be a paradigm of cognitive science in action. These include the studies of mental imagery carried out by Roger Shepherd and various collaborators; Terry Winograd's computer program SHRDLU; and David Marr's tri-level model of the early visual system.
The latter decades of the twentieth century saw challenges to some of the basic assumptions of the "founding fathers" of cognitive science. This was cognitive science's "turn to the brain." A crucial factor here was the development of new techniques for studying the brain. These include the possibility of studying the responses of individual neurons, as well as of mapping changing patterns of activation in different brain areas. In Chapter 3 we look at two pioneering sets of experiments. The first is Ungerleider and Mishkin's initial development of the hypothesis that there are two different pathways along which visual information travels through the brain. The second is the elegant use of positron emission tomography (PET) technology by Steve Petersen and collaborators to map how information about individual words is processed in the human brain. Another important factor was the emergence of a new type of model for thinking about cognition, variously known as connectionism or parallel distributed processing. This is also introduced in Chapter 3.
PART I
HISTORICAL LANDMARKS Th e d i s c i p l i n e m a t u r e s : T h r e e m i l e s t o n e s 32
Language and micro-worlds 33
SHRDLU is capable of various actions in the micro-world, which it can carry out through a (virtual) robot arm. It can pick up the blocks and pyramids, move them around, and put them in the box. Corresponding to the simplicity of the micro-world, SHRDLU's language is relatively simple. It only has the tools to talk about what is going on in the micro-world. There are three principal reasons why SHRDLU was very important in the development of cognitive science. The first is that it gave a powerful illustration of how abstract rules and principles such as those in the sort of grammar that we might find in theoretical linguistics could be practically implemented. If we assume that a speaker's understanding of language is best understood as a body of knowledge, then SHRDLU provided a model of how that knowledge could be represented by a cognitive system and how it could be integrated with other, more general, forms of knowledge about the environment. The second reason for highlighting SHRDLU is that it illustrated the general approach of trying to understand and model cognitive systems by breaking them down into distinct components, each of which carries out a specific informationprocessing task. One of the many interesting things about SHRDLU is that these distinct components are not completely self-contained. The separate processing systems collaborate in solving information-processing problems. There is cross-talk between them, because the programs for each processing system allow it to consult other processing systems at particular moments in the computation.
Does the shortest thing the tallest pyramid's support supports support anything green? use the conversations in which it engaged to report on or navigate its environment.
So-called chatterbot programs such as ELIZA are interesting for many reasons, but not as serious models of how we understand and use language.
Exercise 2.1 Explain in your own words what you think we can learn from programs such as ELIZA. Is it important that a person might be fooled by ELIZA into thinking that we were communicating with another human being?
xxii Preface
Boxes and optional material
Boxes have been included to provide further information about the theories and research discussed in the text. Some of the more technical material has been placed in boxes that are marked optional. Readers are encouraged to work through these, but the material is not essential to flow of the text.
Summaries, checklists, and further reading
These can be found at the end of each chapter. The summary shows how the chapter relates to the other chapters in the book. The checklist allows students to review the key points of the chapter, and also serves as a reference point for instructors.
Suggestions of additional books and articles are provided to guide students' further reading on the topics covered in the chapter.
Applying the symbolic paradigm 186 7.2 ID3: An algorithm for machine learning 187
represents a subset S* of the set of examples. So the algorithm calculates the baseline entropy of S* relative to the target attribute. This is the starting point from which it can then calculate which of the remaining attributes has the highest information gain. The attribute with the highest information gain is selected and assigned to the node.
This process is repeated until each branch of the tree ends in a value for the target attribute. This will happen if the attributes on a particular branch end up narrowing the set of examples down so that they all have the same value for the target attribute.
When every branch is closed in this way the algorithm halts.
ID3 in action
We can illustrate how ID3 works by showing how it can produce a decision tree for solving a relatively simple problem -deciding whether or not the weather is suitable for playing tennis. In order to apply ID3 we need a database. So imagine that, as keen tennis players who seriously consider playing tennis every day, we collect information attribute organizes the remaining examples. It does this by calculating how much the entropy would be reduced if the set were classified according to that attribute. This gives a measure of the information gain for each attribute. Then the algorithm assigns the attribute with the highest information gain to the first node on the tree. Box 7.2 gives the formula for calculating information gain.
Once an attribute has been assigned to the fi rst node we have a tree with at least two branches. And so we have some more nodes to which attributes need to be assigned.
The algorithm repeats the procedure, starting at the leftmost node. The leftmost node Box 7.1 Calculating entropy OPTIONAL Entropy in the information-theoretic sense is a way of measuring uncertainty. How do we turn this intuitive idea into a mathematical formula?
To keep things simple we will just calculate the entropy of a set of examples relative to a binary attribute. A binary attribute is one that has two possible values. The example in the text of Black? is a binary attribute, for example. We need some notation -as follows This is not as bad as it looks! We are working in base 2 logarithms because we are dealing with a binary attribute.
Exercise To make sure that you are comfortable with this equation, refer to the example in the text and check:
(a) that the entropy is 1 when the proportion of black balls is 0.5 (b) that the entropy is 0.88 when the proportion of black balls is 0.7 NB Your calculator may not be able to calculate logarithms to the base 2 directly. The log button will most likely be base 10. You may fi nd the following formula helpful: log2(x) = log(x) ÷ log(2) for any base.
Q
Box 7.2 Calculating information gain
OPTIONAL
We can measure information gain once we have a way of measuring entropy. Assume that we are starting at a node on the tree. It may be the starting node, but need not be. The node has associated with it a particular set S* of examples. If the node is the starting node then S* will contain all the examples -i.e. we will have S* = S. If the node is further down the tree then it will be some subset of S -i.e. we have S* S.
The fi rst step is to calculate the entropy of S* relative to the target attribute A -i.e. Entropy (S*/A). This can be done using the formula in Box 7.1 and gives the algorithm its baseline again. Now what we want to do is to calculate how much that uncertainty would be reduced if we had information about whether or not the members of S* have a particular attribute -say, B.
So, the second step is to calculate the entropy with respect to the target attribute of the subset of S* that has attribute B -what according to the notation we used in Box 7.1 we call B YES . This can be done using the formula from Box 7.1 to give a value for Entropy (B YES /A).
The third step is the same as the second, but in this case we calculate the entropy of B NO with respect to the target attribute -i.e. the subset of S* that does not have attribute B. This gives a value for Entropy (B NO /A).
Finally, the algorithm puts these together to work out the information gain in S* due to attribute B. This is given by the following formula:
Gain (S*, B) = Entropy (S*/A) -Prop (B YES ) × Entropy (B YES /A) -Prop (B NO ) × Entropy (B NO /A)
As in Box 7.1, Prop (A YES ) stands for the proportion of S* that has attribute A.
Strategies for brain mapping 358
Checklist 359 Neuroscientists also adopt the principle of integration -that cognitive functioning involves the coordinated activity of networks of different brain areas (1) Identifying these networks requires going beyond anatomical activity by studying what goes on in the brain when it is performing particular tasks. (2) Some of the techniques for studying the organization of the mind focus on the brain's electrical activity. These include electrophysiology, EEG, and MEG. (3) These techniques all have high temporal resolution -particularly EEG when it is used to measure ERPs. But the spatial resolution is lower (except for electrophysiology using microelectrodes). (4) Other techniques measure blood flow (PET) and levels of blood oxygen (fMRI). These techniques have high spatial resolution, but lower temporal resolution.
The locus of selection problem is the problem of determining whether attention operates early in perceptual processing, or upon representations of objects. It provides a good illustration of how neuroscientists can combine different techniques (1) The problem has been studied using EEG to measure ERPs. Attentional effects appear relatively early in the ERP wave following the presentation of a visual stimulus. (2) These results can be calibrated with PET studies mapping stages in the ERP wave onto processing in particular brain areas. This calibration reveals attentional effects in areas such as V2 and V4, which carry out very basic processing of perceptual features. (3) This resolution of the locus of selection problem seems to be confi rmed by single-unit recordings in monkeys.
The locus of selection problem focuses on spatially selective (or visuospatial) attention. Neuroimaging techniques can help identify the neural circuits responsible for attention (1) Preliminary evidence from brain-damaged patients (e.g. with hemispatial neglect) points to the involvement of frontal and parietal areas in visuospatial attention. (2) This has been confirmed by many experiments on covert attention using PET and fMRI. (3) PET and fMRI experiments on humans, together with single-neuron experiments on monkeys, have shown that tasks involving visuospatial attention also generate activation in brain networks responsible for planning motor behavior and for spatial working memory.
The discussion of attention shows that neuroimaging is a very powerful tool for studying cognition. It is not a "window on the mind," however, and neuroimaging data should be interpreted with caution (1) Neuroimaging techniques can only measure cognitive activity indirectly. PET measures blood flow and fMRI measures the BOLD signal. There is a controversy in neuroscience about what type of neural activity is correlated with the BOLD signal (see section 4.5) -and no worked out theory about how that neural activity functions to process information.
as telling us about effective connectivity when they are really only telling us about functional connectivity. We must be very careful not to draw conclusions about the causal relations between brain areas and how information flows between them from data that only tell us about correlations between BOLD signal levels in those areas.
SUMMARY
This chapter has continued our exploration of the large-scale organization of the mind. Whereas Chapter 10 focused on issues of modularity, this chapter has looked at some of the ways in which cognitive neuroscience can help us to construct a wiring diagram for the mind. We began by highlighting the complex relations between functional structure and anatomical structure in the brain and then looked at some of the techniques for tracing anatomical connections between different brain areas. Completely different tools are required to move from anatomical connectivity to functional connectivity. We looked at various techniques for mapping the brain through measuring electrical activity and blood flow and blood oxygen levels. These techniques all operate at different degrees of temporal and spatial resolution. As we saw in two case studies, each having to do with a different aspect of the complex phenomenon of attention, mapping the functional structure of the brain requires combining and calibrating different techniques. At the end of the chapter we reviewed some of the pitfalls in interpreting neuroimaging data.
CHECKLIST
It is a basic principle of neuroscience that the cerebral cortex is divided into segregated areas with distinct neuronal populations (the principle of segregation) (1) These different regions are distinguished in terms of the types of cell they contain and the density of those cells. This can be studied using staining techniques. worked out models of anatomical connectivity in macaque monkeys, rats, and cats.
